"Supreme Leader" Privileges Disappear as Imperial Restoration Fails

On November 1, 2024, Xi Jinping met with the newly elected Chief Executive of Macau, Ho Iat Seng, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Xi did not use the dragon chair or dragon cup, which some interpret as a sign that his power is waning and his attempt at restoring imperial rule has failed. (Video screenshot)

[People News] On November 1, 2024, Xi Jinping met with the newly elected Chief Executive of Macau, Ho Iat Seng, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Notably, Xi did not use the customary dragon chair or dragon cup, which some interpret as a sign that his power is waning, and his attempt at an imperial restoration has failed. Reports from late October to early November in CCP state media and Xinhua’s series of four commentaries on "studying Xi Jinping’s speeches" have also omitted references to "Xi Jinping Thought." Together, these phenomena suggest that Xi’s once-absolute authority may have been stripped by senior CCP leaders.

During the November 1 meeting with Ho Iat Seng, Xi sat in an ordinary chair, with regular white cups on the table, in stark contrast to previous appearances in Yingtai, where he met former Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and former Macau Chief Executive Ho Iat Seng, using a dragon chair and dragon cup in a setting that evoked the imperial style of the Ming and Qing dynasties. The difference is striking, signaling to observers that Xi’s current status is much diminished.

Political commentator Chen Pokong noted that the change in venue from Yingtai to the Great Hall of the People, along with the absence of the dragon chair and cup, is a clear sign of the CCP’s return to collective leadership and the reinstatement of leadership term limits after the Third Plenary Session. These changes directly reject Xi's personal cult and any potential imperial aspirations, sidelining his "Two Establishments" and "Two Safeguards." With Xi’s military authority also diminished, his imperial aspirations have failed.

Chen pointed out that Xi leveraged three years of COVID-19 lockdowns to sideline party elders and consolidate power at the 20th Party Congress. During the Two Sessions, he visibly removed former General Secretary Hu Jintao from the venue, expelled the Communist Youth League faction, and later targeted former Premier Li Keqiang. This atmosphere fostered an arrogance in Xi, where he felt he could act unrestrained and disregard anyone, exuding an imperial demeanor with his use of a dragon chair and cup—though in a suit and tie rather than traditional imperial robes. During previous meetings with Carrie Lam and Ho Iat Seng, his attitude suggested, “I am the emperor, and you are just provincial officials paying tribute to the capital.”

Chen Pokong stated that Xi Jinping thought Zhongnanhai's Yingtai was an imperial place, believing that showing an imperial demeanor there would be fitting. However, Yingtai is actually a place of tragedy—it was where Emperor Guangxu was confined. Emperor Guangxu spent about ten to twenty years in seclusion there, eventually passing away in melancholy. Therefore, Chen Pokong believes that Yingtai is an inauspicious place.

And Xi Jinping’s use of Yingtai truly did not bring him any benefit; his imperial dream, marked by his amendment to the constitution to extend his term indefinitely, only lasted for a little over two years before it collapsed.

Chen Pokong also noted that during Xi Jinping's attendance at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from October 22 to 24, the level and protocol of the Russian government’s reception were visibly downgraded. Xi was treated with the standard protocol for a regional administrative official rather than that of a national leader. For example, at the end of the welcome ceremony, as he left in a black sedan, only two bodyguards in black ran alongside his car, whereas previously, there were two groups of bodyguards on either side. This indicates a significant reduction in the security level.

Additionally, in the past, when Xi Jinping went on inspection tours, he was usually surrounded by a dense number of bodyguards in black. However, during his recent visits to Fujian and Anhui, the number of these guards decreased significantly.

Chen Pokong commented that it is evident that after the Third Plenary Session, party elders, “second-generation reds” (descendants of revolutionary leaders), and military power figures such as Zhang Youxia have reached a consensus to oppose and prohibit personal cults, effectively halting Xi Jinping's imperial ambitions. With his power diminished, Xi has no choice but to accept the arrangements of collective central leadership.

Su Xiaohuo, known for sharing insider details on CCP leadership on YouTube, recently revealed that Zhang Youxia allegedly removed Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, from the Central Military Commission's Personnel Committee on the grounds that she lacked the rank to participate in personnel decisions. Xi reportedly refrained from opposing this decision, which embarrassed Peng. During his recent visit to Russia, Xi hoped Peng would accompany him, as President Putin is known to appreciate her presence, but she declined.

Su also noted that Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s close aide and director of the CMC Chairman’s Office, has been transferred to a role as a political commissar at the National Defense University, where he wields little influence. Without consulting Xi, Zhang Youxia placed Zhong under investigation. When Xi learned of Zhong’s detention, he publicly rebuked him, calling him incompetent—a move that effectively abandoned Zhong.

Su further mentioned Liu He, who once risked advising Xi to maintain peaceful trade relations with the United States rather than "opening Pandora's box" with COVID-19. Xi rejected Liu’s counsel, viewing him as an adversary ever since. In turn, Liu allegedly criticized Xi, calling him "garbage."

Su commented that Xi’s recent actions against former allies—publicly humiliating Hu Jintao, Wang Qishan, Liu He, Peng Liyuan, and Zhong Shaojun—are prime examples of “burning bridges.”